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Mír je vůl

Světem otřásá mírové hnutí. Že válka je vůl, ví dnes už každý, a kdo se proti válce vysloví, může si být jist, že se přidal na správnou stranu.

Upozornění

Litujeme, ale tato diskuse byla uzavřena a již do ní nelze vkládat nové příspěvky.
Děkujeme za pochopení.

Zobrazit příspěvky: Všechny podle vláken Všechny podle času

adam

originalita za každou cenu
takže ten, kdo podporuje mír,  podporuje totalitní systémy a fanatické diktátory? Možná byste měl už s tím psaním článků přestat pane Steigerwalde. Snažíte se být za každou cenu originální a píšete kraviny.
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27.3.2003 20:11

jurasek

jinak k tomu swarcewhatever nazoru......
Svobodu a bezpečí světa nedělají mírotvorci. Ti svými tanečními kreacemi chválí nebezpečný svět bez svobody. Jejich mír je vůl. Velký stejně jako válka
--------------------
kde vubec idnes bere ty intelektualni liliputy????? co je to vubec za nazor navic mizerne napsany bez mysleni, bez substance a stylu???????? takze ten 50 lety mir je vul, protoze jsme ho docilili jenom diky tanecnim kreacim...lol!...hlavne, ze nase tlusta mirova 50 leta prdel rve z plna hrdel, kolik ta tlusta prdel vazi.....lol!!!!!!!!!!!
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27.3.2003 19:41

jurasek

nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
By Joshua Micah Marshall, Washington Monthly
Imagine it's six months from now. The Iraq war is over. After an initial burst of joy and gratitude at being liberated from Saddam's rule, the people of Iraq are watching, and waiting, and beginning to chafe under American occupation. Across the border, in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, our conquering presence has brought street protests and escalating violence. The United Nations and NATO are in disarray, so America is pretty much on its own. Hemmed in by budget deficits at home and limited financial assistance from allies, the Bush administration is talking again about tapping Iraq's oil reserves to offset some of the costs of the American presence--talk that is further inflaming the region. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence has discovered fresh evidence that, prior to the war, Saddam moved quantities of biological and chemical weapons to Syria. When Syria denies having such weapons, the administration starts massing troops on the Syrian border. But as they begin to move, there is an explosion: Hezbollah terrorists from southern Lebanon blow themselves up in a Baghdad restaurant, killing dozens of Western aid workers and journalists. Knowing that Hezbollah has cells in America, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge puts the nation back on Orange Alert. FBI agents start sweeping through mosques, with a new round of arrests of Saudis, Pakistanis, Palestinians, and Yemenis.
To most Americans, this would sound like a frightening state of affairs, the kind that would lead them to wonder how and why we had got ourselves into this mess in the first place. But to the Bush administration hawks who are guiding American foreign policy, this isn't the nightmare scenario. It's everything going as anticipated.
In their view, invasion of Iraq was not merely, or even primarily, about getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Nor was it really about weapons of mass destruction, though their elimination was an important benefit. Rather, the administration sees the invasion as only the first move in a wider effort to reorder the power structure of the entire Middle East. Prior to the war, the president himself never quite said this openly. But hawkish neoconservatives within his administration gave strong hints. In February, Undersecretary of State John Bolton told Israeli officials that after defeating Iraq, the United States would "deal with" Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Meanwhile, neoconservative journalists have been channeling the administration's thinking. Late last month, The Weekly Standard's Jeffrey Bell reported that the administration has in mind a "world war between the United States and a political wing of Islamic fundamentalism ... a war of such reach and magnitude [that] the invasion of Iraq, or the capture of top al Qaeda commanders, should be seen as tactical events in a series of moves and countermoves stretching well into the future."
In short, the administration is trying to roll the table--to use U.S. military force, or the threat of it, to reform or topple virtually every regime in the region, from foes like Syria to friends like Egypt, on the theory that it is the undemocratic nature of these regimes that ultimately breeds terrorism. So events that may seem negative--Hezbollah for the first time targeting American civilians; U.S. soldiers preparing for war with Syria--while unfortunate in themselves, are actually part of the hawks' broader agenda. Each crisis will draw U.S. forces further into the region and each countermove in turn will create problems that can only be fixed by still further American involvement, until democratic governments--or, failing that, U.S. troops--rule the entire Middle East.
There is a startling amount of deception in all this--of hawks deceiving the American people, and perhaps in some cases even themselves. While it's conceivable that bold American action could democratize the Middle East, so broad and radical an initiative could also bring chaos and bloodshed on a massive scale. That all too real possibility leads most establishment foreign policy hands, including many in the State Department, to view the Bush plan with alarm. Indeed, the hawks' record so far does not inspire confidence. Prior to the invasion, for instance, they predicted that if the United States simply announced its intention to act against Saddam regardless of how the United Nations voted, most of our allies, eager to be on our good side, would support us. Almost none did. Yet despite such grave miscalculations, the hawks push on with their sweeping new agenda.
Like any group of permanent Washington revolutionaries fueled by visions of a righteous cause, the neocons long ago decided that criticism from the establishment isn't a reason for self-doubt but the surest sign that they're on the right track. But their confidence also comes from the curious fact that much of what could go awry with their plan will also serve to advance it. A full-scale confrontation between the United States and political Islam, they believe, is inevitable, so why not have it now, on our terms, rather than later, on theirs? Actually, there are plenty of good reasons not to purposely provoke a series of crises in the Middle East. But that's what the hawks are setting in motion, partly on the theory that the worse things get, the more their approach becomes the only plausible solution.
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27.3.2003 19:08

jurasek

Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
Moral Cloudiness
Ever since the neocons burst upon the public policy scene 30 years ago, their movement has been a marriage of moral idealism, military assertiveness, and deception. Back in the early 1970s, this group of then-young and still mostly Democratic political intellectuals grew alarmed by the post-Vietnam Democrats' seeming indifference to the Soviet threat. They were equally appalled, however, by the amoral worldview espoused by establishment Republicans like Henry Kissinger, who sought co-existence with the Soviet Union. As is often the case with ex-socialists, the neocons were too familiar with communist tactics to ignore or romanticize communism's evils. The fact that many neocons were Jewish, and outraged by Moscow's increasingly visible persecution of Jews, also caused them to reject both the McGovernite and Kissingerian tendencies to ignore such abuses.
In Ronald Reagan, the neocons found a politician they could embrace. Like them, Reagan spoke openly about the evils of communism and, at least on the peripheries of the Cold War, preferred rollback to coexistence. Neocons filled the Reagan administration, and men like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Frank Gaffney, and others provided the intellectual ballast and moral fervor for the sharp turn toward confrontation that the United States adopted in 1981.
But achieving moral clarity often requires hiding certain realities. From the beginning, the neocons took a much more alarmist view of Soviet capacities and intentions than most experts. As late as 1980, the ur-neocon Norman Podhoretz warned of the imminent "Finlandization of America, the political and economic subordination of the United States to superior Soviet power," even raising the possibility that America's only options might be "surrender or war." We now know, of course, that U.S. intelligence estimates, which many neocons thought underestimated the magnitude and durability of Soviet power, in fact wildly overestimated them.
This willingness to deceive--both themselves and others--expanded as neocons grew more comfortable with power. Many spent the Reagan years orchestrating bloody wars against Soviet proxies in the Third World, portraying thugs like the Nicaraguan Contras and plain murderers like Jonas Savimbi of Angola as "freedom fighters." The nadir of this deceit was the Iran-Contra scandal, for which Podhoretz's son-in-law, Elliot Abrams, pled guilty to perjury. Abrams was later pardoned by Bush's father, and today, he runs Middle East policy in the Bush White House.
But in the end, the Soviet Union did fall. And the hawks' policy of confrontation did contribute to its collapse. So too, of course, did the economic and military rot most of the hawks didn't believe in, and the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, whom neocons such as Richard Perle counseled Reagan not to trust. But the neocons did not dwell on what they got wrong. Rather, the experience of having played a hand in the downfall of so great an evil led them to the opposite belief: that it's okay to be spectacularly wrong, even brazenly deceptive about the details, so long as you have moral vision and a willingness to use force.
What happened in the 1990s further reinforced that mindset. Hawks like Perle and William Kristol pulled their hair out when Kissingerians like Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell left Saddam's regime in place after the first Gulf War. They watched with mounting fury as terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists claimed more and more American and Israeli lives. They considered the Oslo accords an obvious mistake (how can you negotiate with a man like Yasir Arafat?), and as the decade progressed they became increasingly convinced that there was a nexus linking burgeoning terrorism and mounting anti-Semitism with repressive but nominally "pro-American" regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In 1996, several of the hawks--including Perle--even tried to sell Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the idea that Israel should attack Saddam on its own--advice Netanyahu wisely declined.
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27.3.2003 19:10

jurasek

Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
When the Oslo process crumbled and Saudi Arabian terrorists killed 3,000 Americans on 9/11, the hawks felt, not without some justification, that they had seen this danger coming all along, while others had ignored it. The timing was propitious, because in September 2001 many already held jobs with a new conservative president willing to hear their pitch.
Prime Minister bin Laden
The pitch was this: The Middle East today is like the Soviet Union 30 years ago. Politically warped fundamentalism is the contemporary equivalent of communism or fascism. Terrorists with potential access to weapons of mass destruction are like an arsenal pointed at the United States. The primary cause of all this danger is the Arab world's endemic despotism, corruption, poverty, and economic stagnation. Repressive regimes channel dissent into the mosques, where the hopeless and disenfranchised are taught a brand of Islam that combines anti-modernism, anti-Americanism, and a worship of violence that borders on nihilism. Unable to overthrow their own authoritarian rulers, the citizenry turns its fury against the foreign power that funds and supports these corrupt regimes to maintain stability and access to oil: the United States. As Johns Hopkins University professor Fouad Ajami recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, "The great indulgence granted to the ways and phobias of Arabs has reaped a terrible harvest"--terrorism. Trying to "manage" this dysfunctional Islamic world, as Clinton attempted and Colin Powell counsels us to do, is as foolish, unproductive, and dangerous as détente was with the Soviets, the hawks believe. Nor is it necessary, given the unparalleled power of the American military. Using that power to confront Soviet communism led to the demise of that totalitarianism and the establishment of democratic (or at least non-threatening) regimes from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait. Why not use that same power to upend the entire corrupt Middle East edifice and bring liberty, democracy, and the rule of law to the Arab world?
The hawks' grand plan differs depending on whom you speak to, but the basic outline runs like this: The United States establishes a reasonably democratic, pro-Western government in Iraq--assume it falls somewhere between Turkey and Jordan on the spectrum of democracy and the rule of law. Not perfect, representative democracy, certainly, but a system infinitely preferable to Saddam's. The example of a democratic Iraq will radically change the political dynamics of the Middle East. When Palestinians see average Iraqis beginning to enjoy real freedom and economic opportunity, they'll want the same themselves. With that happy prospect on one hand and implacable United States will on the other, they'll demand that the Palestinian Authority reform politically and negotiate with Israel. That in turn will lead to a real peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians. A democratic Iraq will also hasten the fall of the fundamentalist Shi'a mullahs in Iran, whose citizens are gradually adopting anti-fanatic, pro-Western sympathies. A democratized Iran would create a string of democratic, pro-Western governments (Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) stretching across the historical heartland of Islam. Without a hostile Iraq towering over it, Jordan's pro-Western Hashemite monarchy would likely come into full bloom. Syria would be no more than a pale reminder of the bad old days. (If they made trouble, a U.S. invasion would take care of them, too.) And to the tiny Gulf emirates making hesitant steps toward democratization, the corrupt regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt would no longer look like examples of stability and strength in a benighted region, but holdouts against the democratic tide. Once the dust settles, we could decide whether to ignore them as harmless throwbacks to the bad old days or deal with them, too. We'd be in a much stronger position to do so since we'd no longer require their friendship to help us manage ugly regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
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27.3.2003 19:11

jurasek

Re: Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
The audacious nature of the neocons' plan makes it easy to criticize but strangely difficult to dismiss outright. Like a character in a bad made-for-TV thriller from the 1970s, you can hear yourself saying, "That plan's just crazy enough to work."
But like a TV plot, the hawks' vision rests on a willing suspension of disbelief, in particular, on the premise that every close call will break in our favor: The guard will fall asleep next to the cell so our heroes can pluck the keys from his belt. The hail of enemy bullets will plink-plink-plink over our heroes' heads. And the getaway car in the driveway will have the keys waiting in the ignition. Sure, the hawks' vision could come to pass. But there are at least half a dozen equally plausible alternative scenarios that would be disastrous for us.
To begin with, this whole endeavor is supposed to be about reducing the long-term threat of terrorism, particularly terrorism that employs weapons of mass destruction. But, to date, every time a Western or non-Muslim country has put troops into Arab lands to stamp out violence and terror, it has awakened entire new terrorist organizations and a generation of recruits. Placing U.S. troops in Riyadh after the Gulf War (to protect Saudi Arabia and its oilfields from Saddam) gave Osama bin Laden a cause around which he built al Qaeda. Israel took the West Bank in a war of self-defense, but once there its occupation helped give rise to Hamas. Israel's incursion into southern Lebanon (justified at the time, but transformed into a permanent occupation) led to the rise of Hezbollah. Why do we imagine that our invasion and occupation of Iraq, or whatever countries come next, will turn out any differently?
The Bush administration also insists that our right to act preemptively and unilaterally, with or without the international community's formal approval, rests on the need to protect American lives. But with the exception of al Qaeda, most terrorist organizations in the world, and certainly in the Middle East, do not target Americans. Hamas certainly doesn't. Hezbollah, the most fearsome of terrorist organizations beside al Qaeda, has killed American troops in the Middle East, but not for some years, and it has never targeted American civilians on American soil. Yet like Hamas, Hezbollah has an extensive fundraising cell operation in the States (as do many terrorist organizations, including the Irish Republican Army). If we target them in the Middle East, can't we reasonably assume they will respond by activating these cells and taking the war worldwide?
Next, consider the hawks' plans for those Middle East states that are authoritarian yet "friendly" to the United States--specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia. No question these are problem countries. Their governments buy our weapons and accept our foreign aid yet allow vicious anti-Semitism to spew from the state run airwaves and tolerate clerics who preach jihad against the West. But is it really in our interests to work for their overthrow? Many hawks clearly think so. I asked Richard Perle last year about the dangers that might flow from the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. "Mubarak is no great shakes," he quipped. "Surely we can do better than Mubarak." When I asked Perle's friend and fellow Reagan-era neocon Ken Adelman to calculate the costs of having the toppling of Saddam lead to the overthrow of the House of Saud, he shot back: "All the better if you ask me."
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27.3.2003 19:11

jurasek

Re: Re: Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
This cavalier call for regime change, however, runs into a rather obvious problem. When the communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe fell after 1989, the people of those nations felt grateful to the United States because we helped liberate them from their Russian colonial masters. They went on to create pro-Western democracies. The same is unlikely to happen, however, if we help "liberate" Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The tyrannies in these countries are home grown, and the U.S. government has supported them, rightly or wrongly, for decades, even as we've ignored (in the eyes of Arabs) the plight of the Palestinians. Consequently, the citizens of these countries generally hate the United States, and show strong sympathy for Islamic radicals. If free elections were held in Saudi Arabia today, Osama bin Laden would probably win more votes than Crown Prince Abdullah. Topple the pro-Western autocracies in these countries, in other words, and you won't get pro-Western democracies but anti-Western tyrannies.
To this dilemma, the hawks offer two responses. One is that eventually the citizens of Egypt and Saudi Arabia will grow disenchanted with their anti-Western Islamic governments, just as the people of Iran have, and become our friends. To which the correct response is, well, sure, that's a nice theory, but do we really want to make the situation for ourselves hugely worse now on the strength of a theoretical future benefit?
The hawks' other response is that if the effort to push these countries toward democracy goes south, we can always use our military might to secure our interests. "We need to be more assertive," argues Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "and stop letting all these two-bit dictators and rogue regimes push us around and stop being a patsy for our so-called allies, especially in Saudi Arabia." Hopefully, in Boot's view, laying down the law will be enough. But he envisions a worst-case scenario that would involve the United States "occupying the Saudi's oil fields
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27.3.2003 19:13

jurasek

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
and administering them as a trust for the people of the region."
What Boot is calling for, in other words, is the creation of a de facto American empire in the Middle East. In fact, there's a subset of neocons who believe that given our unparalleled power, empire is our destiny and we might as well embrace it. The problem with this line of thinking is, of course, that it ignores the lengthy and troubling history of imperial ambitions, particularly in the Middle East. The French and the English didn't leave voluntarily; they were driven out. And they left behind a legacy of ignorance, exploitation, and corruption that's largely responsible for the region's current dysfunctional politics.
Another potential snafu for the hawks is Iran, arguably the most dangerous state in the Middle East. The good news is that the fundamentalist Shi'a mullahs who have been running the government, exporting terrorism, and trying to enrich their uranium, are increasingly unpopular. Most experts believe that the mullahs' days are numbered, and that true democracy will come to Iran. That day will arrive sooner, the hawks argue, with a democratic Iraq on Iran's border. But the opposite could happen. If the mullahs are smart, they'll cooperate just enough with the Americans not to provoke an attack, but put themselves forth to their own people as defenders of Iranian independence and Iran's brother Shi'a in southern Iraq who are living under the American jackboot. Such a strategy might keep the fundamentalists in power for years longer than they otherwise might have been.
Then there is the mother of all problems, Iraq. The hawks' whole plan rests on the assumption that we can turn it into a self-governing democracy--that the very presence of that example will transform politics in the Middle East. But what if we can't really create a democratic, self-governing Iraq, at least not very quickly? What if the experience we had after World War II in Germany and Japan, two ethnically homogeneous nations, doesn't quite work in an ethnically divided Iraq where one group, the Sunni Arabs, has spent decades repressing and slaughtering the others? As one former Army officer with long experience with the Iraq file explains it, the "physical analogy to Saddam Hussein's regime is a steel beam in compression." Give it one good hit, and you'll get a violent explosion. One hundred thousand U.S. troops may be able to keep a lid on all the pent-up hatred. But we may soon find that it's unwise to hand off power to the fractious Iraqis. To invoke the ugly but apt metaphor which Jefferson used to describe the American dilemma of slavery, we will have the wolf by the ears. You want to let go. But you dare not.
And what if we do muster the courage to allow elections, but the Iraqis choose a government we can't live with--as the Japanese did in their first post-war election, when the United States purged the man slated to become prime minister? But if we do that in Iraq, how will it look on Al Jazeera? Ultimately, the longer we stay as occupiers, the more Iraq becomes not an example for other Arabs to emulate, but one that helps Islamic fundamentalists make their case that America is just an old-fashioned imperium bent on conquering Arab lands. And that will make worse all the problems set forth above.
None of these problems are inevitable, of course. Luck, fortitude, deft management, and help from allies could bring about very different results. But we can probably only rely on the first three because we are starting this enterprise over the expressed objections of almost every other country in the world. And that's yet another reason why overthrowing the Middle East won't be the same as overthrowing communism. We did the latter, after all, within a tight formal alliance, NATO. Reagan's most effective military move against Moscow, for instance, placing Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, could never have happened, given widespread public protests, except that NATO itself voted to let the weapons in. In the Middle East, however, we're largely alone. If things go badly, what allies we might have left are liable to say to us: You broke it, you fix it.
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27.3.2003 19:14

jurasek

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
Whacking the Hornet's Nest
If the Bush administration has thought through these various negative scenarios--and we must presume, or at least pray, that it has--it certainly has not shared them with the American people. More to the point, the president has not even leveled with the public that such a clean-sweep approach to the Middle East is, in fact, their plan. This breaks new ground in the history of pre-war presidential deception. Franklin Roosevelt said he was trying to keep the United States out of World War II even as he--in some key ways--courted a confrontation with the Axis powers that he saw as both inevitable and necessary. History has judged him well for this. Far more brazenly, Lyndon Johnson's administration greatly exaggerated the Gulf of Tonkin incident to gin up support for full-throttle engagement in Vietnam. The war proved to be Johnson's undoing. When President Clinton used American troops to quell the fighting in Bosnia he said publicly that our troops would be there no longer than a year, even though it was widely understood that they would be there far longer. But in the case of these deceptions, the public was at least told what the goals of the wars were and whom and where we would be fighting.
Today, however, the great majority of the American people have no concept of what kind of conflict the president is leading them into. The White House has presented this as a war to depose Saddam Hussein in order to keep him from acquiring weapons of mass destruction--a goal that the majority of Americans support. But the White House really has in mind an enterprise of a scale, cost, and scope that would be almost impossible to sell to the American public. The White House knows that. So it hasn't even tried. Instead, it's focused on getting us into Iraq with the hope of setting off a sequence of events that will draw us inexorably towards the agenda they have in mind.
The brazenness of this approach would be hard to believe if it weren't entirely in line with how the administration has pursued so many of its other policy goals. Its preferred method has been to use deceit to create faits accomplis, facts on the ground that then make the administration's broader agenda almost impossible not to pursue. During and after the 2000 campaign, the president called for major education and prescription drug programs plus a huge tax cut, saying America could easily afford them all because of large budget surpluses. Critics said it wasn't true, and the growing budget deficits have proven them right. But the administration now uses the existence of big budget deficits as a way to put the squeeze on social programs--part of its plan all along. Strip away the presidential seal and the fancy titles, and it's just a straight-up con.
The same strategy seemed to guide the administration's passive-aggressive attitude towards our allies. It spent the months after September 11 signaling its distaste for international agreements and entangling alliances. The president then demanded last September that the same countries he had snubbed support his agenda in Iraq. And last month, when most of those countries refused, hawks spun that refusal as evidence that they were right all along. Recently, a key neoconservative commentator with close ties to the administration told me that the question since the end of the Cold War has been which global force would create the conditions for global peace and security: the United States, NATO, or the United Nations. With NATO now wrecked, he told me, the choice is between the Unites States and the United Nations. Whether NATO is actually wrecked remains to be seen. But the strategy is clear: push the alliance to the breaking point, and when it snaps, cite it as proof that the alliance was good for nothing anyway. It's the definition of chutzpah, like the kid who kills his parents and begs the judge for sympathy because he's an orphan.
Another president may be able to rebuild NATO or get the budget back in balance. But once America begins the process of remaking the Middle East in the way the hawks have in mind, it will be extremely difficult for any president to pull back. Vietnam analogies have long been overused, and used inappropriately, but this may be one case where the comparison is apt.
Ending Saddam Hussein's regime and replacing it with something stable and democratic was always going to be a difficult task, even with the most able leadership and the broadest coalition. But doing it as the Bush administration now intends is something like going outside and giving a few good whacks to a hornets' nest because you want to get them out in the open and have it out with them once and for all. Ridding the world of Islamic terrorism by rooting out its ultimate sources--Muslim fundamentalism and the Arab world's endemic despotism, corruption, and poverty--might work. But the costs will be immense.
0/0
27.3.2003 19:15

jurasek

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: nechavam tady vynikajici analyzy z washington monthly, stoji za okopirovani
Whether the danger is sufficient and the costs worth incurring would make for an interesting public debate. The problem is that once it's just us and the hornets, we really won't have any choice.
But he envisions a worst-case scenario that would involve the United States "occupying the Saudi's oil fields and administering them as a trust for the people of the region."
What Boot is calling for, in other words, is the creation of a de facto American empire in the Middle East. In fact, there's a subset of neocons who believe that given our unparalleled power, empire is our destiny and we might as well embrace it. The problem with this line of thinking is, of course, that it ignores the lengthy and troubling history of imperial ambitions, particularly in the Middle East. The French and the English didn't leave voluntarily; they were driven out. And they left behind a legacy of ignorance, exploitation, and corruption that's largely responsible for the region's current dysfunctional politics.
Another potential snafu for the hawks is Iran, arguably the most dangerous state in the Middle East. The good news is that the fundamentalist Shi'a mullahs who have been running the government, exporting terrorism, and trying to enrich their uranium, are increasingly unpopular. Most experts believe that the mullahs' days are numbered, and that true democracy will come to Iran. That day will arrive sooner, the hawks argue, with a democratic Iraq on Iran's border. But the opposite could happen. If the mullahs are smart, they'll cooperate just enough with the Americans not to provoke an attack, but put themselves forth to their own people as defenders of Iranian independence and Iran's brother Shi'a in southern Iraq who are living under the American jackboot. Such a strategy might keep the fundamentalists in power for years longer than they otherwise might have been.
Then there is the mother of all problems, Iraq. The hawks' whole plan rests on the assumption that we can turn it into a self-governing democracy--that the very presence of that example will transform politics in the Middle East. But what if we can't really create a democratic, self-governing Iraq, at least not very quickly? What if the experience we had after World War II in Germany and Japan, two ethnically homogeneous nations, doesn't quite work in an ethnically divided Iraq where one group, the Sunni Arabs, has spent decades repressing and slaughtering the others? As one former Army officer with long experience with the Iraq file explains it, the "physical analogy to Saddam Hussein's regime is a steel beam in compression." Give it one good hit, and you'll get a violent explosion. One hundred thousand U.S. troops may be able to keep a lid on all the pent-up hatred. But we may soon find that it's unwise to hand off power to the fractious Iraqis. To invoke the ugly but apt metaphor which Jefferson used to describe the American dilemma of slavery, we will have the wolf by the ears. You want to let go. But you dare not.
And what if we do muster the courage to allow elections, but the Iraqis choose a government we can't live with--as the Japanese did in their first post-war election, when the United States purged the man slated to become prime minister? But if we do that in Iraq, how will it look on Al Jazeera? Ultimately, the longer we stay as occupiers, the more Iraq becomes not an example for other Arabs to emulate, but one that helps Islamic fundamentalists make their case that America is just an old-fashioned imperium bent on conquering Arab lands. And that will make worse all the problems set forth above.
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27.3.2003 19:16

vlada

?
Není divné, když zastánci války  ( pokud možno dost daleko)na druhou stranu zatracují trest smrti, snaží se omezovat držení a nošení zbraní a při tom všem se ohánějí demokracií a Hitlerem v rovnovážné kombinaci? Přečtěte si pár článků za poslední týden, co všechno se vylíhne v hlavinkách spoluobčanů, vláčených spolehlivě mediální masáží. Já když v sebeobraně zastřelím útočníka, půjdu celkem spolehlivě do vězení, i kdyby se prokázalo já nevím co. Ale když řeknu - mám důvodné podezření, že mne tento občan možná chtěl napadnout a zabít - a bez rozpaků toho dotyčného zabiju, jsem v právu ( asi). Vyřešil jsem přece možný budoucí problém...nebo ne ??? Kvůli tomu, že slušně vládnu dlouhou zbraní přece nepůjdu válčit - ale v Čechách to vlastně tak nebereme....................
 
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27.3.2003 19:02

pstratil@post.cz

Mír je vůl
Větší volovinu jsem dlouho nečetl....Ten pán je fakt TROTL.
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27.3.2003 13:51

blb

Re: Mír je vůl
jste citlivá a hleduplná duše - ten pán je hlavně vůl, pak dlouho nic, a teprve pak se jde bavit ... co dalšího je volem.
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27.3.2003 15:29

Lefty

Článek je dobrý
bez ohledu na to, kým K. Steigerwald je, kým třeba byl. Svérázným způsobem pojmenoval největší slabinu oněch mírových hnutí. Podmínkou jejich existence je totiž demokratický hostitelský systém. Kdysi dávno jsem četl rozhovor s jedním aktivistou Greenpeace, který na otázku, proč neprotestují v Číně proti jaderným zkouškám, odpověděl: "Tam to nemá smysl, není to demokratická země". Nechť si každý domyslí, co by se s aktivisty v Číně, která je shodou okolností proti úderu na Irák, stalo, kdyby "mírové hnutí" nešlo režimu pod fousy.
Nejsem žádný válečný štváč, úder je podle mě jen řešení nejméně špatné. Jenže to ti demonstrující levičáci prostě nepochopí ;_)
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27.3.2003 0:16

barbudo

Arogance moci (projev senátora Roberta Byrda přednesený 19.3.2003 na půdě amerického Senátu)
Věřím v tuto krásnou zemi. Studoval jsem její kořeny a oslavoval moudrost její velkolepé ústavy. Žasnul jsem nad moudrostí jejích zakladatelů a tvůrců. Generace za generaci chápala vznešené ideály tvořící základy naší slavné republiky. Inspirovaly mne příběhy jejich sebeobětování a jejich síly. Ale dnes pro svou zemi pláči. Sledoval jsem s těžkým, přetěžkým srdcem události posledních měsíců. Už neexistuje obraz Ameriky jako silné, ale benevolentní země dohlížející na stabilitu a nenásilí ve světě. Obraz Ameriky se změnil. Po celém světě nám naši přátelé přestávají důvěřovat, o našich slovech je pochybováno, naše úmysly jsou zkoumány. Namísto hledání řešení s těmi, se kterými nesouhlasíme, požadujeme poslušnost, nebo hrozíme obviněním. Místo abychom izolovali Saddama Husseina, ocitili jsme se - zdá se - sami v izolaci. Prosazujeme novou doktrínu předběžného úderu, kterou chápe jen nemnoho a bojí se jí mnozí. Tvrdíme, že Spojené státy mají právo obrátit svou palebnou sílu do kteréhokoliv koutu planety, který by mohl být podezřelý z terorismu. Uplatnili jsme toto právo bez schválení kterékoliv mezinárodní instituce. Výsledkem je svět mnohem nebezpečnější, než byl. Arogantně se chlubíme naší obrovskou mocí. S členy RB OSN zacházíme jako s nevděčníky, kteří urazili naši královskou důstojnost tím, že zvedli ruce z koberce. Naši vzácní spojenci jsou rozděleni. Poté, co válka skončí, budou Spojené státy muset znovu vybudovat mnohem více, než jen Irák. Budeme muset znovu vybudovat po celém světě americký obraz. Důvody, které administrativa uvádí v pokusu zdůvodnit svou posedlost válkou, jsou pošpiněny falešnými dokumenty a nedostatečnými důkazy. Nedokážeme přesvědčit svět o nutnosti této války z jednoho prostého důvodu: Tato válka je naším rozhodnutím. Neexistují přesvědčivé důkazy spojující Saddama s jedenáctým zářím. Věže Obchodního centra byly zničeny protože teroristická skupina al-Káida s buňkami v šedesáti zemích světa udeřila na náš majetek a na náš vliv tím, že změnila naše vlastní letadla v útočné rakety, jedna z nich by zřejmě dopadla na kupoli tohoto překrásného města, naštěstí díky hrdinství a sebeobětování pasažérů na palubě se tak nestalo. Brutalita, jakou jsme zažili 11. září, a další útoky po světě jsou násilnou a zoufalou snahou extrémistů zastavit zasahování západních hodnot do jejich kultur. Proti tomu bojujeme. Je to síla neomezena hranicemi. Je to stínová entita mnoha tváří, jmen, adres. Ale tato administrativa nasměrovala veškerou svou zlobu, strach a bolest, která povstala z popela dvojčat a pokrouceného železa Pentagonu proti jednomu zřejmému ničemovi, takovému, kterého můžeme nenávidět a útočit. A ničemný je. Ale je to ten nepravý ničemník. A tato válka je špatná. Zaútočíme-li na Saddama, zřejmě se nám podaří zbavit ho moci. Ale ochota našich přátel pomoci nám v naší globální válce proti terorismu se zřejmě vytratí také. Celkový stísněný pocit kolem této války neplyne jen z "oranžového poplachu". Je tady vše prostupující pocit chvatu a rizika a příliš mnoho nezodpovězených otázek. Jak dlouho zůstaneme v Iráku? Jaká bude cena? Co je konečným posláním? Jak velké je nebezpečí doma? Stín padl na Senát. Vyhýbáme se naší vážné povinnosti prodiskutovat určitý námět, přestože mnoho tisíc našich synů a dcer loajálně plní svou službu v Iráku. Co se stalo s touto zemí? Kdy jsem se stali národem, který ignoruje a spílá svým přátelům? Kdy jsme se rozhodli riskovat podkopání mezinárodního pořádku tím, že jsme adoptovali radikální a doktrinářský přístup při použití naší hrůzu nahánějící vojenské síly? Jak můžeme opustit diplomatické snahy, zatímco vřava ve světě volá po diplomacii? Proč prezident není schopen vidět, že pravá síla Ameriky nespočívá v její vůli zastrašit, ale v její schopnosti inspirovat? Válka se zdá nevyhnutelnou. Ale stále doufám, že se ten mrak rozplyne. Snad Saddam ukáže záda a uteče. Snad se podaří rozumnosti převážit. Budu se modlit spolu s miliony Američanů za bezpečí našich vojáků, za nevinné civilisty Iráku a za bezpečnost naší vlasti. Snad Bůh požehná Spojeným státům americkým i v neklidných dnech před námi. Snad se nám nějak podaří znovu uchvátit vizi, která nám nyní uniká.
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26.3.2003 12:07

toby

Výborný článek
Krásně se totiž mluví o míru když člověk žije ve svobodné a prosperující zemi a lehce se také opomíjí, že někteří lidé takové štěstí nemají (Irák, Severní Korea) a svobodu a prosperitu si neumí ani představit. Pacifismus není dnes nic jiného než pokrytectví.
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26.3.2003 12:03

rosa

Poprvé
s Vámi, pane Steigerwalde, souhlasím, zato tím intenzivněji!  Skvělá analýza.
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26.3.2003 8:38

pawelll

Re: Poprvé
S vámi pane schweinwalde zásadně nesouhlasím,
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26.3.2003 13:36

antix

ad autor
Vracím se ke své včerejší reakci. Popravdě - velmi by mě překvapilo, kdybych tady našla nějakou odpověď pana Steig. na moji včerejší otázku, tj. jak tedy postupovat v případě mého nesouhlasu s válkou, když podle pana autora je nemístné demonstrovat v ulicích? To je totiž pro tohoto novináře typické: žlučovitě kritizovat, poukazovat, šmahem zatracovat, shazovat, ironizovat - ale poradit východisko, na to už mu asi síly nestačí. Pane Steigerwalde, musíte být dost nešťastný člověk, když dokážete jenom negovat. Zařadila bych vás do jedné škatulky s věčně remcajícím panem Štěpánkem.  Obávám se, že jsou to ty typy lidí, co sází cibuli kořínkama navrch a pak se rozčilují, že nevyrostla.  
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26.3.2003 6:28

Zdělanej hulyč

Re: ad autor
Mám dojem, že úkolem komentátorů a jejich polemik není navrhovat řešení, ale upozorňovat na problémy, nesrovnalosti, nejasnosti a temná místa. Nikdo není vševěd a nevidí do budoucnosti. Navíc jeden člověk nedokáže nic. Jen obrovská moc a bohatství napřené do jednoho bodu dokážou pohnout tak obrovským a setrvačným mechanismem jako je stát...
Pokud s válkou nesouhlasíte, navrhněte Vy sama!!! řešení tohoto problému. A nezapomeňte na řešení dalších problémů (mimo jiné i) v těchto zemích: Čína, KLDR, Kuba, latinskoamerické země a jejich diktátoři, africké diktatury atd atd.
Jak to chcete řešit? Hlavně prosím nepište "hlavně ne válkou", protože to není návrh řešení, ale jen vyloučení jedné možnosti... Nevíte? A jak by to asi měl vědět pan Steigerwald?
Jinak s panem Steigerwaldem souhlasím. Ovšem v článku takového rozsahu to nejde probrat do důsledků. Ona by se dala napsat obrovská monografie k problému každé jednotlivé země, která by brala v úvahu historické a kulturní souvislosti, politické tradice země, způsob myšlení místních lidí, zdroje financování transformací těchto zemí a tak dále a tak dále. O tom by se daly psát romány!
Proto prosím, nepovažujte se za mudrce, neboť nikdo z nás na to nemá...
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26.3.2003 14:36

Martin

Jo dobrý článek.......
Jo dobrý článek....... (Martin, ale jen pokud se ta událost netýká Vás. Máte děti? Pokud ano, dovedete si představit, že Vám je někdo zabije, byť nechtěně? Jak se budete tvářit? Asi nic moc, že? A teď........... Pokud Amící nezasáhnou, tak třebas za 25 let to Vaše děti odskáčou.........Třebas i tak, že nebudou žít. Pokud budete Iráčanem, tak se Vám může stát, že Vaše děti nebudou žít za 25 hodin. Hmmmmmmm, tak jak tu situaci budete řešit? 25 let nebo 25 hodin? Vy znáte jasná řešení kvadratůry kruhu lidských válek? To Vám tedy závidím! Podle mne, vždy záleží na úhlu pohledu a na míře přirozené sobeckosti (myslím bez pejorativního nádechu). Tedy zdá se......... Máte jednoduché vysvětlení....... Tedy i jednoduchou pravdu. A je to opravdu TA správná pravda? Poraďte mi Vy všeznalý.............
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26.3.2003 0:22

Petr Klimovic

Re: Jo dobrý článek.......
Jestli jsem Iracan, tak me dite bude za 25 hodin zabito proto, ze jsem po dobu mnoha let dovolil valdnout Saddamovi Husajnovi. On je mym vladcem a ja tedy musim nest nasledky sveho nicnedelani. Husajn nasral okolni svet v mem jmene a ja jsem mu to dovolil. Nyni musim pykat. Dokud lide neprijmou odpovednost za ciny svych politiku, budou valky.
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27.3.2003 13:28

Vendula

Mir
Ja jsem pro mir a hotovo. Uz se ale vazne hodne zlobim.
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25.3.2003 20:21

mike-š

Vzkaz pro "mírové štváče"...
Tento článek mi mluví z duše. "Mírové" pochody, které z historie znám byly vždy blízké spíše extrémní levici než skutečné demokracii.
Mimochodem, téměř všechny demokratické země si museli svoji svobodu tvrdě vybojovat. Diplomatická jednání s tyrany patří do metod neschopných politiků nebo naivních mladíčků.
Jsem rád, že řady "mírových protestantů" se rekrutují především z lidí, kteří namají faktickou moc reálně rozhodovat o politice. Představa, že by tomu mohlo být jinak mě děsí. Mám rodinu a nechtěl bych se probudit do dne, kdy nás podobné naivní ignorace zla přivedou do nové "osvícené" totality.
Nečekám, že se mnou budete souhlasit. Doufám jenom, že zvládnete reagovat bez primitivních vulgarit. Jsem schopen akceptovat i nesouhlasné názory, pokud mají úroveň.
Takže....?
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25.3.2003 17:18

barbudo

Re: Vzkaz pro
Tak začneme od začátku. Které demokratické země si svoji svobodu vybojovaly? (Mimochodem, jak souvisí svoboda země s demoracií?)
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25.3.2003 17:21

Zdenek Hejnak

Re: Re: Vzkaz pro
Naprosto vsechny.
Snad nechcete popirat minulost ?
Nebo nevite jak vypadal svet ve stredoveku ?
Valky byli, jsou a budou.
Otazka je v jake forme. Ale vzdy kazda valka nekomu pomuze a nekomu ublizi. Podivameli se do dejin, valky take znamenali pokrok. At uz se jedna o rozvoj zivota kdy uspet mohl jen ten kdo prezije nebo valky kratkeho byti cloveka. MI jako lide muze ovlivnit jen zpusob jakym budou vedeny a ne se zavirat pred realitou a rikat, ze jsme ti nejlepsi, protoze chceme mir a valku odsuzujeme.
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25.3.2003 20:01

DD

Re: Re: Re: Vzkaz pro
Nejenze asi vubec neumite cesky (mi, valky byli, znamenali atd.), ale navic placate nesmysly. Pod "pokrok" asi myslite napr. penicilin a rozvoj sifrovani, dobre, ale muzete mi, prosim, sdelit, komu pomohla napr. 2. svetova nebo valka ve Vietnamu? Hlavne zbrojnim firmam, ze? Take vubec nechapu, co myslite pod pojmem "valka kratkeho byti cloveka". Doufam, ze valky ac bylY , uz nebudou.
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25.3.2003 20:18

manox

Re: Re: Re: Re: Vzkaz pro
To je utopie, války byly, jsou a budou. Jen někteří lidé si myslí ale to se mýlí. Můžem pouze svět zlepšovat a to se dá pouze bojem proti zlu (čímž Irák a jeho vůdce je).
 
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25.3.2003 20:37

Zdenek Hejnak

Re: Re: Re: Re: Vzkaz pro
Ovlivnuji me chyby obsah toho co sem napsal ? Myslim, ze ne a priznavam, ze mi to dela potize, ale o to tu snad nejde ...
 
Kratkym bytim cloveka minim to, ze zivot se na nasi panete vyviji miliardy let a hnaci silou vyvoje je boj o preziti.
Nase civilizace je v porovnanim se starim planety v kolebce.
Take Vam chci osvetlit, ze pojemem valka nemyslim, jen to ze stoji armady lidi proti sobe, ale i to, ze firmy podnikaji na burze, snazi se ziskat co nejvice zakazniku, kazdy jednotlivec se snazi aby se mu vedlo co nejlepe ... atd. Tomu rikame civilizace.
 
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26.3.2003 1:22

barbudo

Re: Re: Re: Vzkaz pro
Prosím alespoň pár příkladů vybojované demokracie.
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25.3.2003 21:22

pawelll

Re: Vzkaz pro
Je patrno, že jste vyrůstal v době, kdy jste si neosvojil vlastní názor, dle mého se USA chová stejně jako svého času SSSR, a pakliže uznáváte nerespektování OSN a RB, nezbývá mi nic jiného, než vás politovat, Vám už mozek vymyli dávno a poté pouze přebarvili.
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26.3.2003 13:44

renka

vul je autor clanku
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25.3.2003 16:18

Templar

Steigerwald
Pane Steigerwalde, zapoměl jste na svá komunistická léta? To je snad neskutečný, že takový lidi dostanou prostor. Komunistickej vylupek a dnes hrobnik kultury.
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25.3.2003 15:48

zabi

Re: Steigerwald
On zas tak exemplarni komunistickej vejlupek nebyl. Brzo se z toho vzpamatoval. Ovsem az tehdy, az se z toho vzpamatovali skoro vsichni.
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25.3.2003 20:24

sw

Snad ano...
Článek je výstižný jen v určité rovině a to v té, že mírová hnutí byla vždy zneužívána. Další fakta nám článek již nesděluje a proto je níže uveden (podle mne namístě) povzdech, jak tedy vyjádřit nesouhlas, když je obecná platforma mírových snah diskreditována. Věc je velmi složitá, protože "underground" je vždy velice barevný a jsou v něm shrnuty velmi protichůdné postoje - to znamená, že nemá jednotnou ideu. Je to celé na sociálně-politickou studii - a tu autor asi sestavovat nebude. Jenom se tak na tom tématu povozil.
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25.3.2003 15:10

Žukov

Teď promluvil Vůdce!!!
Pane Steigerwald, vidím, že jste se toho od Lenina a Stalina naučil velmi mnoho, ale alespoň trochu myslet ne. S USA na věčné časy a nikdy jinak!!!
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25.3.2003 15:07

Alex-007

Re: Teď promluvil Vůdce!!!
Amen..
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25.3.2003 21:03

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25.3.2003 15:02

barbudo

Zlo se především nesmí podporovat (ani ve jménu boje proti zlu)!
Autor píše, že je špatně pokud se zlu ustupuje - má pravdu. Autor píše, že neválčit znamená ustupovat zlu - lže. Je mnoho prostředků, jak proti zlu bojovat. Válka je jedním z nich, ale rozhodně to není prostředek jediný a vůbec to nemusí být prostředek nejúčinnější. Voliči v demokratických zemích málokdy mají možnost ovlivnit volbu prostředků boje proti zlu a přitom jejich země proti němu bojují neustále (alespoň se to tvrdí). Když se proti zlu bojovalo dosazováním diktátorů, podporou islámských teroristů nebo podporou nyní aktuálního Saddáma, nikdo nic nenamítal, protože to netušil. To, že válka možná není úplně to nejlepší řešení aktuálního problému naznačuje to, že s ní nesouhlasí i mnoho z těch, kteří se účastnili předchozí irácké války i mnoho odborníků na tuto oblast. O odbornosti aktuálně velících odborníků svědčí leccos i to, že název pro akci v Afghánistánu sestavili na třetí pokus. A jen drobná poznámka k titulku - mír je v zemích koruny české (Kč) zákonem chráněným statkem (zákon 165/1950 Sb.), možná na rozdíl od zemí dolaru amerického (USD).
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25.3.2003 15:01

Z

Re: Zlo se především nesmí podporovat (ani ve jménu boje proti zlu)!
Ano, je mnoho jinych metod, ale co kdyz selzou a diktator porusuje dalsi a dalsi dohody? (kolik rezoluci OSN Irak porusil jen od r. 1991?) Ja to trochu priblizim. Jdete v noci po ulici a nekdo napadne vas hledany zlocinec. Take s nim budete jednat? V Iraku je to IMO naprosto stejna situace, jenom v "trochu" vetsim meritku.
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25.3.2003 20:46

barbudo

Re: Re: Zlo se především nesmí podporovat (ani ve jménu boje proti zlu)!
Těžko zdůvodníte válku tím, že prosazujete rezoluci RB OSN, pokud RB OSN tuto válku odmítá. Musíte si ji zdůvodnit jinak.
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25.3.2003 21:27

briksen

největší manipulátoři
největší manipulátoři a demagogové jsou novináři tohole typu-ty si nikdy nezapomenou kuchynskej budiček nařídit na správnej čas,aby ty svý nudlovatý názory nakydali na naše talířky v pravej čas a vokořenili to výzvou-žerte moje moudra....polemizovat s takovejmi týpky je ztráta času-voni sou placeni vod řádku a v situaci kreslířů dikobrazu-vypotit jednou za den usmolenej politickej vtip--tomu se ale nemuže soudnej člověk zasmát ani z útrpnosti-i když byl starej havlíček borovskej jakejkoliv--na čistotu svejch botiček dbal vždy-pucoval si je vo štajgervaldrohožky.
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25.3.2003 14:27

xx

Hutné, výstižné a pravdivé
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25.3.2003 14:19

en

Re: Hutné, výstižné a pravdivé
snad nemluvite vo svy stolici
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25.3.2003 14:54

antix

vážený pane autore
Nějak jsem z toho vašeho článku nepochopila, jak se mám tedy zachovat v případě, že jsem proti válce? Až dosud jsem se domnívala, že kromě písemných reakcí na různé články v novinách je dost účinná metoda vyjádřit nesouhlas ta, že vyjdu do ulice s namalovaným heslem a tím, že takto zveřejním politický postoj, budu jednat v souladu se svým svědomím a donutím snad příslušné činitele minimálně k zamyšlení.  A hle - tady čtu, že půjdu v jedné řadě s militantními bojovníkyi, kterým vůbec nejde o nějaké protesty proti válce a jsou vůbec jen krvelačné bestie., které se chtějí tak akorát vyřádit v ulicích. Můžete mi tedy poradit, jak postupovat jinak? Nebo mám zvolit pasivní rezistenci? Jo, a ten titulek - ani jste se nemusel podepisovat.
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25.3.2003 14:12

Ondřej Audy

Konečně to někdo vyjádřil veřejně!
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25.3.2003 13:07

Saddám

Absolutní souhlas.
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25.3.2003 12:37

Templar

Re: Absolutní souhlas.
Nejses moc originalni. Skoda.
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25.3.2003 15:53

Shillo

Tak to je pravda
Ktomu clanku neni co dodat mam ten istý nazor.
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25.3.2003 12:29

kanydza

Steigerwald ??? kdo to je?
 Zajimavý názor od pana Steigerwalda...hlavně potom, co je mi známo, jak se choval za minulého režimu.....miluju takové prubuzené a uvědomělé "aktivisty", kteří procitli 17. listopadu 1989. Pane Stegerwalde, vy máte ještě drzost psát do novin? Kde jste byl, když bylo potřeba něco dělata a hlasitě vyjadřovat své názory...zalezlý v díře...a TEĎ JSTE TRIBUN.... chtěl bych mít váš žaludek a vaše svědomí.
0/0
25.3.2003 12:19





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