pro ruletu
Nasel jsem tento docela dobry clanek—zatim asi nejlepsi k problematice ZHN, i kdyz az moc dlouhy—ale zato informacne vycerpavajici---ukazuje, jakej ten Saddam je haj*l---a je fakt, ze Saddam tu hrozbu opravdu predstavoval, akorat asi doslo k omylu ohledne casoveho horizontu-a byl to i vysledek politickeho tlaku, podle me ale ospravedlnitelneho—----A kdo vi-----zase je tu ta info od toho Baradeje----v kazdem pripade ale ZHN nebyly jedinym duvodem....------------------
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/pollack.htm---------------------- The war was not all bad. I do not believe that it was a strategic mistake, although the appalling handling of postwar planning was. There is no question that Saddam Hussein was a force for real instability in the Persian Gulf, and that his removal from power was a tremendous improvement. There is also no question that he was pure evil, and that he headed one of the most despicable regimes of the past fifty years. I am grateful that the United States no longer has to contend with the malign influence of Saddam's Iraq in this economically irreplaceable and increasingly fragile part of the world; nor can I begrudge the Iraqi people one day of their freedom. What's more, we should not forget that containment was failing. The shameful performance of the United Nations Security Council members (particularly France and Germany) in 2002-2003 was final proof that containment would not have lasted much longer; Saddam would eventually have reconstituted his WMD programs, although further in the future than we had thought. That said, the case for war—and for war sooner rather than later—was certainly less compelling than it appeared at the time. At the very least we should recognize that the Administration's rush to war was reckless even on the basis of what we thought we knew in March of 2003. It appears even more reckless in light of what we know today.